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Renforcer le système de brevet ? Effets des barrières de brevet et de la diffusion des 
connaissances sur le développement de nouvelles industries, progrès technique et bien-
être social 
Résumé 
Cet article développe le modèle évolutionniste de dynamique industrielle de Vallée & 
Yildizoglu (2006) de manière à mener une analyse théorique plus riche des conséquences 
d’un système de brevet renforcé. Ce modèle prend explicitement en compte les effets 
potentiellement positifs des brevets  : La publication des brevets participe à la 
construction d’un stock collectif de connaissances sur lequel les innovations peuvent 
s’appuyer et les brevets abandonnés peuvent fournir une nouvelle source de progrès 
techniques aux firmes retardataires. Ces dimensions positives sont mobilisées pour 
questionner les résultats négatifs de Vallée et Yildizoglu (2006). Les principaux résultats 
du nouveau modèle montrent que les effets positifs ne contrebalancent pas les 
conséquences négatives sur le progrès technique et le bien-être social d’un système de 
brevet plus fort, même si ce dernier est une source de meilleure protection et de profits 
plus élevés pour les firmes. Le modèle intègre aussi l’effet des brevets sur la survie et le 
développement des industries naissantes.  
Mots-clés :  Innovation, Progrès technique, Système de brevet, Droits de propriété 
intellectuelle (DPI), Politique technologique 
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to carry out a richer theoretical analysis of the consequences of a stronger patent system. 
This model explicitly takes into account the potentially positive effects of patents: 
publication of patents participates to the building of a collective knowledge stock on 
which new innovations can rely, and dropped patents can provide a source of 
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& Yildizoglu (2006). The main results of the new model show that these positive effects 
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and global technological progress, even if it is a source of better protection and higher 
profits for the firms. The model also considers the effect of patents on the survival of the 
newly founded industries and on their development. 
Keywords: Innovation, Technical progress, Patent system, Intellectual property rights 
(IPR), Technology policy. 
JEL : O3, O34, L52 
Reference to this paper:YILDIZOGLU Murat, “Reinforcing the patent system? 
Effects of patent fences and knowledge diffusion on the development of new industries, technical 
progress and social welfare”, Working Papers of GREThA, n°  2008-17, 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/grt/wpegrt/2008-17.html. Reinforcing the patent system? Eﬀects of patent fences and
knowledge diﬀusion on the development of new industries, technical
progress and social welfare
Murat Yıldızo˘ glu1
University of Bordeaux
GREThA (UMR CNRS 5113)
Avenue L´ eon Duguit
F-33608 PESSAC
yildi@u-bordeaux4.fr
1Murat Yıldızo˘ glu gratefully acknowledges the support of the CCRRDT Program of the Aquitaine region.Abstract
This article extends the industry dynamics model of ? in order to carry out a richer theoretical
analysis of the consequences of a stronger patent system. This model explicitly takes into account
the potentially positive eﬀects of patents: publication of patents participates to the building of a
collective knowledge stock on which new innovations can rely, and dropped patents can provide a
source of technological progress for ﬁrms that are lagging behind the leaders of the industry. These
dimensions of the patent system are used to question the negative results of ?. The main results
of the new model show that these positive eﬀects do not counterbalance the negative eﬀects of a
stronger patent system on social welfare and global technological progress, even if it is a source of
better protection and higher proﬁts for the ﬁrms. The model also considers the eﬀect of patents on
the survival of the newly founded industries and on their development.
Keywords: Innovation, Technical progress, Patent system, Intellectual property rights (IPR), Tech-
nology policy
JEL Classiﬁcation: O3, O34, L521 Introduction
This article develops the analysis initiated in ? on the social costs and beneﬁts of a stronger patent
system. The actual tendency of the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) policies in United States and
in Europe eﬀectively correspond to the strengthening and to the extension of the patent system as
a global incentive device for private (and even public - see the motivation of the Bayh-Dole Act on
US university research) innovative eﬀorts.
The actual tendency is generally motivated by the conventional economic wisdom aﬃrming that
a strong patenting system yields convenient incentives for private investment in Research and De-
velopment (R&D) and hence for technical progress in society. In the incentive based vision, the
patent system solves two problems caused by the public good nature of technological innovation: the
monopoly position granted by the patent corrects the insuﬃcient incentives to invest in private R&D
and the publication of the patent assures the diﬀusion of the invented knowledge. As a consequence,
this vision establishes the patent system as a perfect source of social and technological eﬃciency
in the long term: the innovation-driven growth is supposed to largely compensate the static dead–
weight loss of the transitory monopoly position and the limited span of the property rights granted
by the patent (the oﬃcial maximal patent life) reinforces this positive dynamic eﬀect by limiting the
number of periods during which this dead-weight incurs.
The weaknesses of the patent system to fulﬁll such a role has been emphasized in the literature
since Arrow’s classic article (Arrow (1962)) that underlines that the patent system must be extremely
complex and subtle in order to secure complete appropriation of the invention by the innovator.
Moreover, this purely incentive based approach of technological dynamics and of the role of patenting
largely underestimates the complexities of the dynamics of the existing technological systems. Hence,
it is not surprising that this view is quite systematically challenged by empirical studies and, more
speciﬁcally, by the recent results about the diversiﬁed role that the patents are called to play in
diﬀerent industries and other stylized facts about patenting by ﬁrms. Following van Dijk (1994),
Cohen, Nelson & Walsh (2000), Gallini & Scotchmer (2002), Hall (2002) and Mansﬁeld (1986), we
can underline some interesting stylized facts about patenting:
• Most innovations combine elements from existing products;
• Inventing around a patent occurs (with an average cost advantage of 35%);
• The eﬀective lifetime of a patent is generally shorter than the legal lifetime (less than 8 years
for the 50% of the patents in the UK and France);
• Patents are useful to impede imitation (the supplementary imitation cost due to the existence
of a patent is industry-speciﬁc, with weights from 7% to 30%);
• The propensity of patenting has heavily increased in the last decade. This propensity is
industry-speciﬁc and it is higher for larger ﬁrms.
The last observation is in fact quite overwhelming. Since 1978, the European Patent Oﬃce
(EPO) has studied more than two millions patent applications. It has received over 120 000 patent
applications in 2004. Figure 1 clearly shows the explosion of the number of patent applications from
1990 and on (more than 76% of these two millions patents have been ﬁled after 1990).
Another important observation that comes to dominate our empirical understanding of the patent
system concerns the quite low esteem in which the ﬁrms consider patents in comparison with other
tools that they commonly use (like secrecy, the lead time or having recourse to complementary
services or manufacturing.The 1994 Carnegie Mellon Survey of the U.S. manufacturing sector (see
Cohen et al. (2000)) clearly shows that the main motivation for patenting does not correspond to
the theoretical argument used in defence of a stronger patent system (better incentives for R&D).
This observation, combined with the recent surge in patenting gives rise to what is called today the























Figure 1: Applications to the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO)
patent paradox (low eﬀectiveness but high patenting – see Hall & Ziedonis (2001) for electronics
ﬁrms). As a consequence, it is quite diﬃcult to ignore that patenting is very frequently used by ﬁrms
for strategic reasons: constructing patent fences around discrete inventions; building negotiation
power through a patent portfolio in complex industries, especially for cross-licensing issues, etc.
This strategic use of the patent system must be taken into account in the evaluation of its
social costs and beneﬁts using a dynamic setup that allows the analysis of potential intertemporal
ineﬃciencies. Would a stronger patent system foster technological innovations if ﬁrms use it for
impeding their competitors’ progress? Is the knowledge diﬀusing eﬀect suﬃcient to compensate
the static ineﬃciencies due to the monopoly position? Does the publication of the patents assure
eﬃcient knowledge diﬀusion, enough to compensate the potentially negative eﬀects of patent fencing
and, ﬁnally yield a higher social welfare and technological pace? The model we develop in this
article aims to tackle these questions. In order to focus on the role of patent fences in technology
dynamics, we deliberately disregard some other important aspects of these questions like the potential
ineﬀectiveness of the patents and the potentially positive eﬀect of patents through licensing. Both
issues are underlined in the literature (already in Arrow (1962); see also Bessen & Meurer (2008)
for a more recent discussion). We disregard the possible ineﬀectiveness of patents in order to place
the model in a framework favorable to patents. We exclude licensing issues from the model because
their integration would necessitate a much more complex model, with many supplementary causal
mechanisms and because the model would become much less tractable, even using Monte Carlo
simulations.
This article proposes an extension of the evolutionary model of ? in order to present a more
balanced view of patents. Indeed, in the evaluation of the social costs and beneﬁts of a stronger
patent system, ? exclusively focuses on the technology dynamics resulting from patenting motivated
by the building of patent fences. Several potentially positive eﬀects of patents are neglected in this
ﬁrst study. We now develop a richer model where these eﬀects are taken into account: if a ﬁrm drops
a patent, the latter can now contribute to the global technological progress by allowing retarded
ﬁrms to adopt it. Also, the publication of patents contributes to the general knowledge level of the
industry and to potential technological progress through innovation. The possibility of keeping secret
the technological knowledge is also introduced as an alternative appropriation tool. We evaluate the
2global eﬀects of these positive aspects of the patent system in interaction with eﬀects of patent fences
on technology dynamics. Moreover, we also analyze the role of the patent system in the birth and
development of new industries. The main results of the article show that the potentially positive
eﬀects of the patent system are not suﬃcient for justifying a stronger patent system.
The next section will present the main characteristics of the model. The third section will be
dedicated to the presentation of our simulation protocol and of the results of the model. We will
provide results on the role of patents in the birth and death of industries; in the determination of
social welfare and of technical progress. Our results show that a stronger patent system has negative
eﬀects on all these dimensions. A special attention will be given to the mechanisms that are behind
these results. The last section will conclude the article. The appendix gives the initial values and
the meaning of the parameters and the variables used in the model.
2 The Model
This model concerns an industry producing a homogenous good and facing a decreasing, constant
elasticity market demand. It extends the initial model of ?. This initial model was an extension
of the industrial dynamics model of Nelson & Winter (1982). The actual model is also inspired by
Winter (1993) that was the ﬁrst model incorporating patents in the Nelson & Winter (1982) model.
As in the Nelson & Winter (1982) model, the only production factor is physical capital, and
technology has constant returns to scale. In each period, each ﬁrm shares its gross proﬁts between
diﬀerent investment outlets: R&D, physical capital, patent budget, and saving. R&D investment
is necessary for the imitative and innovative activity of the ﬁrm. Technical progress comes from
disembodied process innovations and corresponds to the increase of the productivity of the ﬁrm’s
capital stock.




Contribution to innovation Imitation by other firms Protection
Or patent dropped
SECRECY
Figure 2: The Life of a patent...
The industry is initially populated by a unique ﬁrm with random characteristics (drawn following
a normal distribution centered on common averages). This ﬁrm is the founder of the industry.
Its technology is drawn from a log-normal distribution centered on the initial value of the latent
productivity in this economy (see paragraph 2.2). The population of ﬁrms evolves as a consequence of
the entry and exit processes (see paragraph 2.3). In each period, the short-period market equilibrium
ﬁxes the price at which the consumers buy this product, given their demand function. Market
price determines the ﬁrm’s gross proﬁts, and these proﬁts are used for investing in diﬀerent assets
(strategies): innovation and imitation follow from the R&D investment; physical capital increases as
a consequence of the investment; the patent budget is used to ﬁnance new patents or to renew the
patent portfolio of the ﬁrm; the saving can provide supplementary revenues for investing in future
periods. These strategies evolve as a consequence of the social learning of ﬁrms (see paragraph 2.1).
In this model, we dedicate a particular attention to the patenting strategies of the ﬁrms and
to diﬀerent dimensions of the patent system. Patents can contribute to the aggregate technological
advance at three levels: (a) a patented technology is protected from imitations and from innovations
too similar to it (given the patent height corresponding to the patent system); (b) when a granted
3patent is published, it contributes to the collective knowledge stock of the industry on which the
innovations are based (this eﬀect is controlled by the ratio of the publication date to patent life –
see Figure 2); (c) when a patent is dropped or when it arrives to the end of the patent life, the
corresponding technology becomes available to all ﬁrms in the industry (the technology becomes
free). The channels (b) and (c) constitute the contribution of this model in the construction of a
fairer picture of the patent system’s welfare eﬀects. If an invented technology is not ﬁled for a patent,
it remains secret for the competitors of the innovator. In this case, the appropriability conditions
of the industry are represented by the parameter SECRECY that gives, in probabilistic terms, the
eﬀectiveness of secrecy (the higher the SECRECY, the lower the probability of being imitated). In
accordance with the empirical results emphasized in the introduction, the patenting strategies of the
ﬁrms are driven in this model by their desire to build patent fences in order to slow their competitors
behind them.
In the rest of this section we will brieﬂy present the main components of the model. The articu-
lation of these components is depicted in the Figure 3 and the simpliﬁed pseudo code of the model
is given in Figure 4.

























Figure 3: The main connections in the model
2.1 Strategies and learning processes of ﬁrms
At the beginning of each period, the ﬁrm must decide how to spend the gross proﬁts and the savings
from previous periods. In our model, these revenues can be allocated between four alternative assets
(see Figure 3):
Investment in physical capital: The ﬁrm expands its capital stock in order to increase its market
share. IKRATE is the initial average value of this investment rate around which the strategies
of the ﬁrms are created.
R&D investment: R&D allows the ﬁrm to create new technologies, or to imitate the technology of
a successful competitor. IRDRATE is the initial average value of this investment rate around
which the strategies of the ﬁrms are created.
4Patent budget: In order to prevent other ﬁrms from beneﬁting from its technological investments,
the ﬁrm can decide to protect innovations. We assume that a technology may only be patented
if it is suﬃciently distinct from an already patented technology. The patent oﬃce can be more
or less indulgent and this dimension of the patent system is represented in our model by the
variable PATENTHEIGHT. A patented technology can be protected for a maximum of
PATENTLIFE periods. A new patent costs NEWPATENTCOST, and renewing a patent
for one more period requires the payment of RENEWPATENCOST. PATENTRATE is
the initial average value of the investment rate around which the strategies of the ﬁrms are
created.
Savings: Firms can save a part of their proﬁts. Involuntary savings arise when one of the budget
lines is not spent in its totality. Otherwise, the saving is precautionary, since it enables the
ﬁrm to oﬀset certain consequences of unforeseen events (e.g. negative proﬁts). In our model,
if a ﬁrm gets negative proﬁts and it does not have any more saving, it quits the industry.
SAV INGRATE is the initial average value around which the strategies of the ﬁrms are created.















j,t = 1. (1)
In each period, the learning of the ﬁrms is represented through an evolutionary algorithm: ﬁrms
learn through imitation of the strategies of others and through random experimenting (mutations).
In our model, the imitation is based on the market size of the opponents (rather than on their
proﬁts, as in Silverberg & Verspagen (1994)). As a consequence, a bigger competitor will have a
higher probability of being imitated (the probability of being imitated is equal to the market share of
each ﬁrm). When imitation occurs, the imitator adopts the strategy vector of the imitated ﬁrm. The
strategy vector of each ﬁrm can also change in each period as a consequence of random experimenting.
These two mechanisms are respectively commanded by the probabilities PROBIMITATE and
PROBMUTATE.
2.2 Technical progress and patenting
Technical progress is a potential result of the innovation and imitation processes of ﬁrms. The success
of these processes is an increasing function of the R&D investment of the ﬁrms in the industry.
Entering ﬁrms beneﬁt from the advancement of the technological knowledge in Society and their
innovations are driven by the evolution of the latent productivity (see section 2.3). Firms may ﬁle
patents in order to protect new technologies from imitation by competitors.
Productivity gains: innovation and imitation
In our model, innovation is a two-stage stochastic process as in Nelson & Winter (1982). A ﬁrst
draw determines if the ﬁrm has been successful to innovate. The probability of this success increases
with the R&D investment. A second draw then gives the eﬀective new productivity that results from
the innovation. This Gaussian draw is centered on a mean that corresponds to the average of the
actual technology of the ﬁrm and the best published technology of the period (the weight of this
factor is controlled with the parameter WEIGHTPUB):
µi
t = Ai








t   ℵ(µi,t,σin)
(2)
where Ai
t is the actual productivity of the ﬁrm, A
f
t the highest free productivity and ˜ Ai
t the result of
the innovation. As a consequence, if a ﬁrm is behind the published knowledge, it can beneﬁt from it
for accelerating its technical progress. It should be noted that a new technology may only be used
and patented if it is not protected by an existing patent (given the PATENTHEIGHT).
5A ﬁrm can also beneﬁt from imitating a successful competitor’s technology. Imitation is rather
rare and the probability of success again increases with the R&D investment of the ﬁrm. Only
unpatented technologies can be imitated. When the imitation happens, each competitor has a prob-
ability of being imitated that increases with its market share.
The last possibility for technological progress is the adoption by the ﬁrm of a technology that
has been patented in the past, but that is not anymore protected by a patent (the original ﬁrm has
stopped renewing the patent or the patent has become older than the PATENTLIFE).
Patenting
The management of the patent portfolio is very crucial in our model. When a new technology
is found, the inventor can choose to protect it by ﬁling a patent. A ﬁled patent is supposed to be
automatically validated by the Patent Oﬃce if it is not infringing on an existing patent. We do not
consider in this model the important complexities that arise from the uncertainties of the veriﬁcation
period by the patent oﬃce. We deliberately adopt here a vision quite favorable to patents. If the
ﬁrm does not protect it, the technology may be imitated (given the level of SECRECY representing
the appropriability regime in this industry) or invented around by the competitors.
A ﬁrm will only patent a technology if (a) the technology is seen as suﬃciently interesting to
patent (eﬀective in slowing the competitors, in accordance with the strategy of patenting studied in
this article), and (b) if the ﬁrm owns a suﬃcient patenting budget. More speciﬁcally, the probability
of adopting (or keeping) a particular patent is given by a normal distribution that depends on the
relative eﬃciency of the technology. Eﬃciency of a given technology is measured by the number
of ﬁrms that have a productivity lower than the productivity of this technology: the higher the
number of such ﬁrms, the more eﬃcient the patent in slowing the competitors. We also assume that
ﬁrms cannot perfectly observe the eﬃciency of their innovation and they are prone to errors. This
eﬃciency criterion represents the patent fencing strategies of ﬁrms. The probability of patenting a




+ ε, ε   N (0,σ) (3)
The same criterion is used for renewing existing patents. The ﬁrm considers the possibility of
renewing patents by beginning with patents corresponding to the highest productivity.
In the beginning of each period, the ﬁrm tries to reserve a budget for patenting. This budget
should cover two kinds of expenses: (a) the cost of maintaining previously ﬁled patents, (b) the
possible cost of ﬁling a patent for a new innovation. This budget results from the investment strategy
of the ﬁrm on patenting.
2.3 Entry and exit
In this model, the size of the industry, in terms of active ﬁrms, is allowed to change at each period.
In each period, there are ENTRY RATE attempts to entry in the industry. This variable represents
the easiness to entry to this industry (the height of the barriers to entry, when these barriers corre-
spond to other dimensions of the industrial regime, like the institutional ones). The corresponding
number of potential entrants attempt to enter into the market in each period, with randomly drawn
characteristics, but only candidates with technologies that are not impeded by an existing patent can
eﬀectively enter. Firms rely on global technological knowledge for developing the technology with
which they enter the industry. Hence, technologies of all entering ﬁrms are driven by the latent pro-
ductivity in the economy that results from the advancement of the scientiﬁc knowledge (as in Winter
(1993)). The productivity of each new ﬁrm is drawn from the log-Normal distribution centered on
the latent productivity of the period
λ(t) = L0 + γt
log(Ae
t)   ℵ(λ(t),σin)
(4)
6where Ae
t is the productivity of the potential entrant. If the corresponding productivity is already
protected by a patent, the entry can not take place. Other dimensions of the entrants are normally
drawn around actual industry averages. We also assume that only the entrants who expect a positive
proﬁt, given the actual level of the market price, would enter. Once in the industry, each ﬁrm relies
on internal R&D and published patents to innovate (following 2).
Even with negative proﬁts, a ﬁrm may stay in the industry as long as it holds some positive savings
that oﬀset the loss. When this is no longer the case, the ﬁrm exits the industry (bankruptcy).
For each period t, until t = T :
1. Populating the industry:
• if t = 1: creation of an industry composed of 1 ﬁrm (the founder)
• if t > 1: entry of new ﬁrms (ENTRY RATE) and exit
2. Computation of the production levels: Qi
t and the total supply Qt
3. Computation of the intra-period price (as a function of the inverse demand function): pt
4. Computation of the gross proﬁts and social surplus
5. Saving results at the industry level
6. Compute imitable productivities
7. Randomize the order of play of ﬁrms in the current period t
8. Setting of the diﬀerent budget levels for R&D, investment, patenting, savings and dividends
9. Investment of ﬁrms in capital
10. Innovation of ﬁrms
11. Eﬀective imitation of technologies (using the list established in step 6)
12. Management of the patent portfolio and patenting
13. Technical progress through the adoption of free technologies
14. Computation of the list of the productivities of the active ﬁrms
15. Computation of the lists of all patented, published and free productivities in the industry
16. Diﬀusion of the best strategies in the industry (depends on the market shares of ﬁrms) and mutation of
strategies
Figure 4: The pseudo code of the model
3 Simulation protocol and results
3.1 Simulation protocol
Given the complexity of the interactions that we model, we adopt a methodology that allows quite
a systematic exploration of the parameter space of the model. This methodology is close to the
Monte-Carlo method. We execute 20000 runs of 100 periods each, where the results from each period
have a probability of 10% of being saved. We also systematically save the ﬁrst and the last periods.
The ﬁrst period data is only used for checking the initial conﬁgurations. So, for each run we obtain
an average number of 12 observations for all variables. 9320 runs correspond to industries that are
able to survive 100 periods. We mainly use these runs in the results we discuss in this article. The
7paragraph 3.3 will summarize the results of the econometric analysis of the determinants of the
probability of dying for an industry.
All runs are initialized with a unique initial ﬁrm (the founder of the industry) with randomly
drawn characteristics (the capital stock of the ﬁrm and its strategies). The means around which these
characteristics are randomly drawn are given in the Appendix A. This appendix also contains the
means around which other parameters of the model are uniformly drawn for each run, in accordance
with the Monte Carlo methodology, and the meaning of the parameters and the variables used in
this article. The productivity of the initial ﬁrm is drawn around λ(1). We do not necessarily
discuss in the text all the parameters that appear in this appendix, but only the most signiﬁcant
ones. As a result, we obtain a set of 175 303 observations covering quite a diversiﬁed subset of the
parameter space. We analyze the observations sampled from the last half of each run (letting time






. This sample contains 53 901 observations. We use for this analysis box
plots (giving the four quartiles of the distributions of the variables), non-parametric Wilcoxon rank
sum tests (WRS tests) between subsets, linear and probit regressions and, regression trees. The
statistical analysis is conducted using R − project (see R Development Core Team (2003))1. In the
boxplots, the box gives the central 50% of the sample centered on the median: the box hence gives
the ﬁrst, second and third quartiles (Q1,Q2,Q3) of the distribution. The whiskers give the signiﬁcant
minimum and the signiﬁcant maximum of the distribution.









































































































Figure 5: Eﬀectiveness of the patent system. Boxplots with values cumulated over T periods
3.2 Eﬀectiveness of the patent system
We ﬁrst check that the possibility of patenting is eﬀectively used by the ﬁrms in the economy and that
these patents are eﬀective in protecting their holders’ technology. Before establishing this property,
we introduce a coding scheme for the main dimensions of the patent system that we use in the rest
of the article.
Figure 5 introduces the role of the two main dimensions of the patent system: patent life and
patent height, which also covers patent breath in this model. We use the following categorical coding
of these variables.
Notation 1 Classifying values of the variables PATENTHEIGHT and PATENTLIFE:
1A detailed statistical appendix can be found at the following addres:
http://beagle.u-bordeaux4.fr/yildi/files/patents2-statisticalappendix.pdf
8• We use the value l (low) for a variable x when x is inferior to the second quartile of its
distribution: l ⇔ x ≤ Qx
2 and
• the value h (high) in the complementary case: h ⇔ x > Qx
2.
For example, the conﬁguration hl corresponds to (patentlife = high,patentheight = low): a
patent system where the patent oﬃce grants relatively long-lived and narrow patents. The conﬁgu-
ration hh would correspond to what we call a “strong” patent system that gives a high protective
capacity to new patents. In comparison, the conﬁguration hl corresponds to a system where granted
patents have long maximal life but a narrow scope (their PATENTHEIGHT is low (l)).
In our model, patents can be used to:
• allow the patenting ﬁrm to protect its innovation from imitations;
• allow the patenting ﬁrm to prevent the competitors who have invented an already protected
technology from using it;
• allow the patenting ﬁrm to impede entry by ﬁrms with similar technologies.
Figure 5 shows that patents do eﬀectively impede imitations, innovations and new entry in this
economy. These boxplots show that higher patent height is the main source of eﬀectiveness in
impeding imitations, innovations and entry. A longer patent life has a complementary eﬀfect. We
also remark that short and narrow patents are favorable to imitations and entry. Boxplot (b) shows
that a very signiﬁcant proportion of the potential innovations are blocked by the existing patents and
this eﬀect is maximal when the patent life is relatively high and the patents are broad. These global
results are also conﬁrmed using linear regression for the last period variables (cf. online statistical
appendix, and also Table 12).
Proposition 1 The protective role of patents is eﬀective in our model: patents impede imitations
and innovations by the competitors and the entry of new competitors. A patent regime with short
and narrow patents is the most favorable one to entry and imitations.
Given that the patent system is eﬀective in this economy, we can now study the impact of a
stronger patent system on social welfare in order to verify if a reinforcement of the patent system
is socially desirable. Before getting to this point of the analysis, we shortly discuss the factors that
cause the death of industries.
3.3 Why do industries die?
Only 46.6% of the created industries are able to survive 100 periods in this model. The section E of
the online statistical appendix gives probit regression results on the determinants of the probability
to dying before period 100. Several factors play a signiﬁcant role:
Market conditions and costs: The probability of dying increases with the elasticity of the de-
mand (ETA), entry attempts (ENTRY RATE), ﬁxed costs (FC) and unit capital cost (cost)
and decreases with the size of the demand (DEM). These results are not surprising, except
maybe the one concerning the role of the easiness of entry: it seems that entry can play a
destabilizing role.
2The Table 1 gives the sign of the coeﬃcients with a statistical signiﬁcance of at least 5% (detailed results are
available in the section B. of the online statistical appendix). Only the main dimensions of the patent system and
the technology regime are used as independent variables. Only relationships that are signiﬁcant over all conﬁgurations
ﬁgure in this table.
9Learning of ﬁrms: The probability of dying decreases with the probability of imitation of the
strategies and the probability of mutation. Higher learning rates are hence favorable to the
survival of the industry.
Patent system and technology regime: The probability of dying increases with the patent height
and patent life, as well as with the publication date of the patents and the weight of the pub-
lished patents in the innovation process. Secrecy also is unfavorable to the survival of the
industry but, in accordance with the ﬁrst elements, the patent costs decrease the probability
of dying. A stronger patent system and weak diﬀusion of the technologies are consequently
unfavorable to the survival of the industry.
Proposition 2 New industries have more diﬃculty to survive when the patent regime is stronger.
The rest of our analysis is focused on industries that have been able to survive 100 periods.
Variables PL PH PPDR NPC RNPC SEC WP
1 SS − − − + +
2 CS − − − (∗) − +
3 averprofit + + − − + (∗) +
4 activeN − − + −
5 invCI − − + + +
6 averprod − −
7 nbentry − − +
8 maxprod − −
9 nbpat + − + +
10 cumnbpat + −
11 maxpatage + − −
12 cumnbinnov − − −
13 nbpatfirms + − + +
14 cumimpedentry + + −
15 cumimpedinnovrel + −
16 cumimpedimit − − +
17 cuminnovfree − − + (∗)
(∗) : Signiﬁcant only at 10%.
Patent system:
PL: PATENTLIFE PN: PATENTHEIGTH PPDR: PATENTPUBDATERATIO
NPC: NEWPATENTCOST RNPC: RENEWPATENTCOST
Technological regime: WP: WEIGHTPUB SEC: SECRECY
Table 1: The global role of patent system’s dimensions. Linear regresion results for t ≥ Qt
2. Sign of
the coeﬃcients signiﬁcant for α = 5%.
3.4 Patent system and social welfare
We begin the analysis by our central question about the patent system: is a stronger patent system
desirable from the social point of view. In order to obtain a ﬁrst indication on the eﬀects of the main
two dimensions of the patent system on social welfare, we compute the median values of consumers’
surplus, average proﬁts and social surplus in 10 equally sized intervals of values of these dimensions
of the patent system (PATENTLIFE and PATENHEIGHT).3.
Proﬁts. The second column in Figure 6 indicates how the median of average proﬁt evolves when the
values of these dimensions increase. Graphs (a2,b2) indicate that the average proﬁts of the ﬁrms are
respectively higher in patent systems with longer PATENTLIFE and higher PATENTHEIGHT
(broader patents). Non-parametric (WRS) test results given in Table 2 and the linear regression
3PATENTHEIGHT is a continuos variable and PATENTLIFE is discrete. We call the cut function of R-project
in order to divide the random values of these variables in 10 equally sized intervals.




























































































































Figure 6: Patent system and welfare (t ≥ Qt
2). Medians computed in 10 equally spaced intervals of
PATENTLIFE and PATENTHEIGHT values.
Variable Ordering
Consumer surplus ll > lh > hl > hh
Average proﬁts ll < hl < lh < hh
Social surplus ll > lh > hl > hh
Average productivity ll > hl > lh > hh
Maximal productivity ll > hl > lh > hh
Table 2: Patents and social welfare. Summary of the results of WRS tests (α = 1%) given in the
online appendix D (for values from periods t ≥ Qt
2).
results of Table 1, line 3 conﬁrm these results. WRS test results show that the main determinant
dimension is the height of the patents (broad patents give higher proﬁts even if the patent life is
short). Firms clearly beneﬁt from a stronger patent system in our model. Does this mean that we
should favor such a system? In order to answer this question, we must take into account the global
eﬀect of such a system, including the consumers’ welfare.
Consumers’ surplus and social welfare. The last column of Figure 6 exhibits the evolution of social
welfare. Graphs (a3-b3) indicate that a stronger patent system is harmful on social welfare: the
negative eﬀects of these dimensions on consumers’ surplus (given in the ﬁrst column of the ﬁgure)
clearly overweigh the supplementary proﬁts of the ﬁrms. The WRS test results again conﬁrm these
results, as well as the regression results. As a consequence, short-lived and narrow patents are more
beneﬁcial to social welfare (but the patent life is the most determinant dimension here).
The results concerning the social welfare are summarized in the following proposition (they are
also conﬁrmed by the results of Table 1).
Proposition 3 (Results on social welfare)
• It is socially preferable to have short-lived narrow patents instead of long-lived broad ones (to
11answer the central question posed by O’Donoghue, Scotchmer & Thisse (1998)).
• The Pareto-dominant patent system conﬁguration is the mildest one (ll) and it grants short-lived
and narrow patents. Even if the proﬁts of the ﬁrms are the lowest in this case, the consumer’s
surplus is the highest and this eﬀect dominates the social surplus in our dynamic framework.
• The worst situation from the point of view of social welfare corresponds to the strongest patent
system with longest and broadest patents (hh).
The technical progress is another (and even more) relevant criteria for comparing patent regimes
from the eﬃciency point of view. As a matter of fact, establishing a more eﬃcient innovation system
is the declared objective of the defendants of a stronger patent system. The rest of the article will
focus on the connection between the dimensions of the patent system and technical progress.






















































































































Figure 7: Technical progress is decreasing with PATENTHEIGHT (t ≥ Qt
2)
3.5 Patent regimes and technical progress
Is a stronger patent system favorable to technical progress? We have already observed that patents
are eﬀective in impeding innovations of the competitors and imitation. But, they can nevertheless
be favorable to technical progress by protecting leaders in the industry. We now consider the ﬁnal
eﬀects of a stronger patent system on global technical progress.
The Figures 7–(a,b) give the distributions of the average and maximal productivities and they
clearly show that the most strong technical progress is observed in the mildest patent system where
the patent life is the shortest and the patents are the narrowest (the conﬁguration ll). We have also
the highest number of innovations in this case (Figure 7(c)). Again, the strongest patent system (hh)
corresponds to the weakest performance. These ﬁgures give the same answer to the main question
of O’Donoghue et al. (1998): from the technological point of view also, it is preferable to have short-
lived and narrow patents. These results are conﬁrmed by the WRS tests (see Table 2), since these
tests induce the following ordering for the average productivity and maximal productivity between
conﬁgurations: ll > hl > lh > hh. As a consequence, a lower patent height is favorable to technical
progress. If patents are broad, shorter patents are preferable. In even a more global level, lines 6
and 8 in Table 1 show that technical progress is slower when the patent system is stronger. As a
consequence, the negative result on the social utility of a stronger patent protection is very systematic
in this model.
12Proposition 4 (Technical progress 1) A stronger patent system implies a weaker technical progress.
The highest average and maximal productivities are observed in economies where the patent oﬃce
grants short-lived and narrow patents.
We can establish these results in a more detailed way by using regression trees. The regression
tree of Figure 8 gives the dimensions of the patent system that most signiﬁcantly determinate the
technical progress measured by the average productivity.











Figure 8: Patent dimensions and average productivity (t ≥ Qt
2). Very low patent heights are the key
to maximal productivity.
A regression tree (Venables & Ripley (1999), chapter 10) establishes a hierarchy between inde-
pendent variables using their contributions to the overall ﬁt
 
R2
of the regression. More exactly,
it partitions the set of observations in sub-classes characterized by their values in terms of their
contribution to the overall ﬁt and of their predictions for the dependent variables (all dimensions
of the patent system that are modiﬁed by the Monte Carlo procedure are included as explanatory
variables in the regressions). This value is validated against a fraction (10%) of the sample that is not
used during the estimation. Regression trees are very ﬂexible and powerful in the clariﬁcation of the
structure of the observations. The tree gives a hierarchical sequence of conditions on the variables of
the model: the higher the role of a condition in the classiﬁcation of the observed cases, the higher its
status on the tree. For each condition, the left branch gives the cases for which the condition is true
and the right branch gives the cases that are compatible with the complementary condition. At each
end of the tree, we have cases that verify the intersection of several conditions and the tree indicates
the expected value of the independent variable in the corresponding conﬁguration and the number
of cases that verify all these conditions.
The tree 8 is constructed by using all dimensions of the patent system as potential explana-
tory variables. The top branch show that the height of the patents is the main determinant and,
following the right branch of the tree, we observe that the highest productivity is observed when
PATENTHEIGHT is inferior to 3.4%. That corresponds to very narrow patents in this model.
Following the left branch, we observe that for heights superior to 12.8%, the highest productivity
is observed when PATENTLIFE is inferior to 3 periods. This again corresponds to very short
patents in this model. Other dimensions of the patent system play a much less signiﬁcant role and
they do not appear in this tree. These results conﬁrm the proposition 4.























Figure 9: Eﬀects of patents and average productivity (t = T). The dominant role of impeded entry
and free technologies.
The question of the mechanisms through which patents determine the technical progress then
arises. We know that these mechanisms must correspond to the following eﬀects of patents: impeding
entry, impeding imitations, impeding innovations and allowing ﬁrms to catch up using technologies
that become free after the abandoning of the corresponding patents.
We study the role of these eﬀects in the tree of Figure 9. Initially, all these eﬀects are in-
cluded as potential explanatory variables (cumimpedentry, cumimpedimit, cumbimpedinnovrel and
cuminnovfree that give the cumulative numbers on these eﬀects).
These results clearly show that the main impeding eﬀect that plays against the average produc-
tivity is the impeding of new entry. On the most right branch, we observe that the highest expected
average productivity is attained when the number of impeded entries is lower that 58 and when the
ﬁrms strongly beneﬁt from free technologies. The potential role of the patents in the diﬀusing of
knowledge eﬀectively helps the industry in technical progress. On the most left branch, we see, on the
contrary, that lower expected average productivities are observed when entry is frequently impeded.
Proposition 5 (Technical progress 2) The negative impact of patents on technical progress mainly
arises from their role in impeding entry. Patents eﬀectively contribute to technical progress in the
industry by allowing the public use of abandoned technologies but this eﬀect is not suﬃcient to com-
pensate their negative eﬀects.
3.6 The role of other dimensions of the patent system
The preceding analysis shows that the life and height of patents play the main role in the inﬂuence
of patent system on welfare and technical progress. The Table 1 shows that other dimensions also
play secondary and more partial roles.
Does the publication date play a signiﬁcant role? Early publication of patents (lower PATENT-
PUBDATERATIO) has a positive eﬀect on the consumers’ surplus and the average proﬁts of the
ﬁrms. It decreases the patenting activity of the ﬁrms and, even if its increases the concentration of
the industry, earlier publication increases the number of innovations.
14Proposition 6 (Technical progress 3) If patents are present, their early publication is beneﬁcial to
technical progress and to consumers’ welfare.
The ﬁling cost of new patents (NEWPATENTCOST) has a negative impact on social welfare
since it decreases the surplus of the consumers and the proﬁts of the ﬁrms. The renewal cost does
not play a globally signiﬁcant role.
We also observe that the eﬀect of the published patents is positive on social welfare (through
WEIGHTPUB) since all components of this welfare increase in industries where this eﬀect is
stronger.
4 Conclusion
This article checks the validity of the negative results of ? on patent fences, in a context where the
potentially positive eﬀects of the patents are explicitly taken into account: publication of patents
participates to the building of a collective knowledge stock, on which the innovations can rely, and
dropped patents can provide a source of technical progress for ﬁrms that are lagging behind the
leaders of the industry. The main results of the model show that these eﬀects do not counterbalance
the negative eﬀects of a stronger patent system on social welfare and on the global technological
progress, even if stronger patents are sources of better protection and higher proﬁts for the ﬁrms:
we observe that industries have diﬃculty to survive with stronger patent systems and, that such
systems yield lower social welfare and technical progress. The negative impact of patents on technical
progress mainly arises from their role in impeding entry. Patents eﬀectively contribute to technical
progress in the industry by allowing the public use of abandoned technologies but this eﬀect is not
suﬃcient to compensate their negative eﬀects through the impeding of the introduction of innovations
by the competitors (patent fencing). Consequently, the results of the model do not advocate the
establishment of a stronger patent system.
Our model is simple and has several shortcomings. We do not explicitly address the diﬀerentiated
roles that patents can play in diﬀerent technological regimes Merges & Nelson (1990)). In order to
keep the model simple, we also disregard the positive eﬀects that can result from licensing. The
inclusion of licensing would necessitate a much more complex representation of the strategies of the
ﬁrms, with necessarily many supplementary assumptions. We do not address either the potential
ineﬃciency of patents to protect from imitation, but this is deliberately chosen in order to consider
the most favorable case to patents. Since our results are negative, the inclusion of this possibility
would even more strengthen these results. Our approach do not include institutional dimensions of
the patent system either, and their role has been emphasized in recent studies that criticize the de
facto reinforcement of the U.S. patent system in the 80s, as a consequence of important institutional
reforms (like the establishment of the Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit, cf. Jaﬀe & Lerner (2004)).
Even with these shortcomings, we nevertheless consider that our model teaches us interesting insights
about the potentially harmful eﬀects of a patent system when ﬁrms chose to twist it to build patent
fences and block the advancement of their competitors and hence, of the industry.
These results deﬁnitely need to be qualiﬁed, mainly in two directions. In the ﬁrst place, a
better and more realistic representation of the cumulative nature of the technology space must be
developed. One strategy could consist in the construction of a more complex technology space with
an explicitly modeled dependence structure between early technologies and later ones. This strategy
can only be convincing if we can ﬁnd a simple and neutral way of representing this dependence. A
more immediate reﬁnement is the introduction of a multi-dimensional technology space in order to
distinguish the height and the breadth of the patents. It would also be very interesting at this stage
to distinguish the lagging breadth of patents from their leading breadth. Last but not least, a model
of product innovations would deﬁnitely complete our analysis by more directly introducing the role
of the demand in industry dynamics and the corresponding eﬀects of a stronger patent system.
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16A Initialization of the main parameters of the model
Exogenous variables
N = 1 : Initial number of ﬁrms
T = 100 : Number of periods
PROBIMITATE ∈ [0,0.005] : Probability of imitation
PROBMUTATE ∈ [0,0.005] : Probability of mutation
SIGMA IN ∈ [0.1,4.1] : Standard deviation of the innovative draws
PATENTRATE ∈ [0,1] : Initial average share of the patent budget in the gross proﬁts
SAV INGRATE ∈ [0,1] : Initial average share of the savings in the gross proﬁts
IKRATE ∈ [0,1] : Initial average share of the investment in physical capital in the gross proﬁts
IRDRATE ∈ [0,1] : Initial average share of the R&D budget in the gross proﬁts
ENTRY RATE ∈ [1,20] : Number of entry attempts in each period
λ0 = 0.5 : Initial level of the latent productivity
γ = 0.05 : Slope of the latent productivity
With these values, the productivity of the entrants is drawn around exp(5.5) = 244.7 at t = 100.
NEWPATENTCOST ∈ [0,5] : Cost of ﬁling a new patent
RENEWPATENTCOST ∈ [0,1] : Cost of renewing an existing patent
PATENTHEIGHT ∈ [0,1] : The height of the granted patents. If the patent correspond to the pro-
ductivity A0, all productivities in [A0 · (1 − PATENTHEIGHT),A0 · (1 + PATENTHEIGHT)]
are protected from the competitors.
PATENTLIFE ∈ [0,30] : Legal maximal life of patents
PATENTPUBDATERATIO ∈ [0,1] : The ratio of the publication date to the oﬃcial patent life
(PATENTLIFE)
EQUITY ∈ [10,60] : Initial average equity of the ﬁrms
WEIGHTPUB ∈ [0,1] : The weight of the maximal published productivity in the innovation process of
the ﬁrms
SECRECY ∈ [0,1] : The eﬀectiveness of the secrecy to protect new inventions from imitation
CF ∈ [0,12] : Fixed costs of the ﬁrms
K ∈ [10,60] : Initial average capital stock of the ﬁrms
COST ∈ [0,1] : Initial average unit using cost of the capital
DEM ∈ [500,1000] : Demand coeﬃcient
ETA ∈ [0.5,0.9] : Elasticity of demand
p = DEM/QETA
Endogenous variables
price : Market price
n : Number of active ﬁrms
averprofit : Average proﬁts
CS : Consumers’ surplus
SS : Social surplus
maxprod : Maximal productivity of the period
averprod : Average productivity of the period
activeN : Number of active ﬁrms in the industry
invCI : Inverse Herﬁndall index of the period
nbinnov : Number of innovations in the period
nbpat : Total number of active patents in the period
maxpatage : Age of the oldest active patent
nbpatfirms : Number of patenting ﬁrms in the period
cumbpat : Cumulated number of the patents in the industry history
cumnbinnov : Cumulated number of innovations
cumimpedentry : Cumulated number of entry trials impeded by the existing patents
17cumimpedinnov : Cumulated number of innovations impeded by the existing patents
cumbimpedinnovrel : cumimpedinnov/cumnbinnov : proportion of innovations impeded by patents.
cumimpedimit : Cumulated number of imitation trials impeded by the existing patents
cuminnovfree : Cumulated number of technical progress steps obtained thanks to free technologies
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